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Subsidies for Expression and the 
Future of Free Exercise 
Wayne McCormack* 
Along with maybe a handful of others, I tentatively believe 
that Justice Scalia may have been right in Smith,' despite the 
manifold problems with the ~p in ion .~  In essence, he said that 
laws of general applicability may be applied to religiously 
motivated practices without meeting the compelling state 
interest test.3 The reason that I support this holding is that 
judicial granting of religious exemptions from laws of general 
applicability would be tantamount to judicial establishment of 
religion. It would force the judiciary both to define religion and 
to assess what are acceptable religious practices, an  
undertaking fundamentally a t  odds with the spirit of the First 
Amendment and with the pluralism of contemporary society. 
On the other hand, my eighteenth century liberalism cries 
out for protection of individual matters of conscience and rebels 
a t  the thought of leaving a constitutionally based liberty to the 
mercy of the political process? Therefore, I find myself 
waffling on the issue because I want to be assured that 
individual liberty will receive sufficient protection under other 
headings such as freedom of expression. 
This leads me to a comparison of Smith with cases in  other 
areas of constitutional law, notably freedom of expression and 
* Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law. 
1. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
2. Smith has received almost universal condemnation from commentators. For 
two of the more devastating critiques, see Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free 
Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Michael W. McCo~e l l ,  Free Exercise Revisionism 
and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990). By contrast, only a few 
authors have supported the outcome. See Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: 
Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment, 52 U. m. L. REV. 75 (1990); William P. Marshall, In Defense 
of Smith and Free Erercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991); Ellis West, 
The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. PoL'Y 591 (1990). 
3. Smith, 494 U.S. at  878-82. 
4. See id. at 890. 
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establishment of religion. I find many of these cases picking up 
on a t  least one recurrent theme in today's world: the 
elimination of government subsidies on a number of fronts. 
Individual speech-a~tions,~ both in the religious arena and 
elsewhere, are subject to this phenomenon. I will discuss Smith 
in relation to government grants that limit abortion advice, 
limitations on the degree to which government must provide a 
public forum for expression, and Establishment Clause cases 
that limit government subsidies to religious expression or 
practices. I conclude by trying to link the Establishment Clause 
no-subsidy command to these other developments, including 
Smith's elimination of judicially crafted exemptions for 
religious practices. 
The Smith proscription of judicial inquiry into the meaning 
of religion draws into question legislative exemptions and 
accommodations in a host of areas, including tax exemptions 
- and personnel exemptions such as those in Title VII. As far- 
fetched as this assertion might seem, it parallels other 
developments. Elimination of legislative exemptions for 
religious practices may well be the next stage of separation of 
church and state. 
I. JUSTICE SCALIA'S APPROACH TO EXPRESSIVE 
AND WORSHIPFUL CONDUCT 
A number of cases, involving not only religion but also 
symbolic speech and hate speech, make it apparent that Justice 
Scalia is out to rewrite First Amendment law, with the 
apparent approval of a large segment of the existing Supreme 
Court! The emerging nature of his First Amendment analysis 
is that the Amendment creates no individual rights but instead 
erects limits on how government may conduct its business. This 
is not a meaningless distinction because the limit on 
governmental behavior is purpose-based rather than result- 
based. In Justice Scalia's view, the First Amendment prevents 
government from taking action directed toward a particular 
religious practice or subject of e~pression;~ it does not protect 
religion or expression from 'law[s] of general appli~ability."~ 
5 .  This term refers to any communication by speaking or writing. 
6. See, e.g., RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992); Barnes v. Glen 
Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2463 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
7 .  Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-82. 
8. Id. at 886 n.3 (quoting opinion of O'Co~or, J., concurring). 
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After reading Smith, my initial reaction was, "Okay, now 
we just argue claims for religious exemptions as claims for 
freedom of expression." Professor Greenawalt forecast this 
approach, calling it "reductionist" because it would reduce 
religion to expression.' As Professor Greenawalt also predicted, 
this approach does not protect very much, a t  least as Justice 
Scalia would apply it. 
This position is easily tested by asking whether a claim 
similar to that made in  Smith-exemption from generally 
applicable criminal laws for religious use of peyote-would 
have prevailed as an expression claim. Justice Scalia gave a 
clear answer at the first opportunity, in Barnes v. Glen 
Theatre, Inc." His concurring opinion in Barnes, rejecting a 
claim for constitutional protection of nude dancing as a form of 
expression, emphasized repeatedly that government may 
declare any practice unlawful. He maintained that such 
declarations need be based on no more compelling grounds 
than that a majority find the practice objectionable or immoral, 
so long as the prohibition is of general applicability-meaning 
that it is not aimed at "conduct precisely because of its 
communicative attributes."ll Much of his concurring opinion in  
Barnes was taken directly from the Smith opinion, which he 
acknowledged by citing Smith for the proposition that "general 
laws not specifically targeted a t  religious practices did not 
require heightened First Amendment scrutiny even though 
they diminished some people's ability to practice their 
religion."12 
With respect to symbolic expression, Justice Scalia quoted 
language from his own dissenting opinion, written as a circuit 
court judge, in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt13 
(the sleeping on the lawn case): 
[Tlhe only First Amendment analysis applicable to laws that 
do not directly or indirectly impede speech is the threshold 
inquiry of whether the purpose of the law is to suppress 
communication. If not, that is the end of the matter so far as 
First Amendment guarantees are concerned; if so, the court 
9. Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. 
REV. 753, 756-57 (1984). 
10. 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2463 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
11. Id. at 2466. 
12. Id. at 2467. 
13. 703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting), reu'd sub nom., Clark 
v.. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 486 U.S. 288 (1984). 
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then proceeds to determine whether there is substantial 
justification for the proscription.14 
The most surprising part of this formulation is that no First 
Amendment protection exists for the individual engaged in 
expressive conduct; the only limitation is that government may 
not target communication. This approach is identical to the 
Smith formulation that asks, with regard to religious practices, 
only whether the government purpose is to suppress 
religion.'' And the Watt statement does not even require a 
compelling state interest when the proscription is targeted at 
communication; it merely requires a "substantial justification." 
Both Smith and Barnes, then, shift away from emphasis on 
the interest of the individual and move toward inquiry into the 
governmental purpose. This occurs despite frequent Supreme 
Court pronouncements that it will not inquire into the intent of 
the legislature but will examine a law's validity on the basis of 
the impact that it actually has on protected interests? I have 
often told my students that defining rights is not a good way to  
think about individual liberties. We should think of the Bill of 
Rights as limitations on government rather than definitions of 
protected rights, and these limitations should be explored in 
terms of the legitimate necessities of the governmental 
enterprise. But I never meant for my students to believe that 
government is free to do whatever it wishes so long as it does 
not intend to suppress communication or religion; rather, I 
merely intended to force the analysis to focus on the strength of 
the governmental justification in a pre-weighted balancing 
process. 
The Scalia Smith-Barnes formulation regarding laws of 
general applicability is said to apply only in the arena of 
expressive conduct. Justice Scalia was careful in both opinions 
to  point out that First Amendment protections require 
14. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2467 (quoting Watt, 703 F.2d a t  622-23). 
15. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-82. 
16. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980); 
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968). Professor Ely and Professor 
Tribe have pointed out that it is more appropriate for the Court to inquire into 
legislative motive when some negative prohibition of the Constitution is at stake 
than when the question is the initial power to enact the provision. LAWRENCE H. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 814-20 (2d ed. 1988); John H. Ely, 
Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 
(1970). But neither Ely nor Tribe suggests that impact becomes irrelevant, as 
Justice Scalia seems to indicate in Barnes and Smith. 
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heightened scrutiny when "speech" is restricted, but there may 
be little in this protection.17 Having seemingly created a 
category of protected activity known as communication, he then 
collapsed the distinction. In Barnes, he argued that "virtually 
every law restricts conduct, and virtually any prohibited 
conduct can be performed for an expressive purpose."18 It is 
obvious that any form of communication requires the act of 
speaking or writing-a "speech-act." Thus, the conduct portion 
of any communication can be regulated by a "law of general 
applicability'' so long as the target of the regulation is not the 
expression. The result is that no constitutional protection exists 
for sound trucks, picketing, or flag burning (to use Scalia's own 
 example^)'^ if government applies a restriction unrelated to 
the message. 
The rule that government cannot target communication is 
said to provide comfort against conscious repression. But 
expression can be either self-expression, communication with 
another, or both. Under Smith-Barnes, a religious "practice" 
might be protected by the Constitution fiom a regulation aimed 
at communication but not from one aimed at self-expressive 
acts. Focusing on the latter aspect of expression would allow 
the government to target the noncommunicative portion, 
despite any spillover into suppression of communication. That 
is why nude dancing, even in fully consensual settings and 
even recognizing its expressive components, can be suppressed 
with only the justification that the majority finds it 
unappealing. Under this formulation, the targeting of conduct 
by the Hialeah small-animal ordinances20 would be valid 
despite their impact on self-expression. What made the 
ordinances unconstitutional is that they targeted a particular 
form of expression precisely because of its religious nature.21 
The targeting rationale can also make the First 
Amendment stand for the proposition that government must 
suppress in neutral fashion all communication of a certain type 
if it suppresses any portion. This proposition was part of 
17. Smith, 494 US. at 885-86; Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2465-66 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
18. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2466. 
19. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2544-45 (1992). 
20. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 
2217 (1993). 
21. Id. at 2233. 
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Justice Scalia's message in R.A.V. v. City of St. the 
"hate speech" case. Holding that the St. Paul ordinance was 
defective because it singled out certain categories of hate 
speech but not others,23 Scalia was accused by concurring 
Justices of adopting a test of "underinclusiveness.~~24 Scalia 
responded that he was not condemning the law for its failure to 
restrict more speech, but because it singled out certain 
categories of unprotected speech on the basis of their 
content.25 Again, R.A.V. deals with expressive behavior- 
burning a cross-but the ordinance and the opinion would 
reach all forms of communication with the prohibited content. 
In Justice Scalia's formulation, then, government is apparently 
allowed to  prohibit all speech that the speaker should know 
would cause "anger, alarm, or re~entment,"~~ but it is 
impermissible to single out speech that would cause "anger, 
alarm, or resentment" on the basis of the listener's race, creed 
or gender.27 
Prior to  Smith, Barnes, and R.A.V., I told my students that 
they should view all human communicative activity on a 
spectrum, from "thought" at one end to "action" at the other. 
The point on the spectrum at which we place a certain speech- 
act would depend on the propensity of the statement to affect 
another person. The more likely it is that the statement affects 
others, the less justification would be required for government 
intervention. This approach is similar, if not identical, to Judge 
Learned Hand's formulation in Masses Publishing? By 
contrast, Justice Black insisted on a rigid distinction between 
speech and conduct,2g and the frequent approach of the 
Supreme Court was to treat differently speech that had an 
impact and conduct that had elements of communication. The 
former could be protected under the "clear and present danger" 
test while the latter could be protected to some extent under 
the complex four-part O'Brien test.30 
22. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). 
23. Id. at 254247. 
24. Id. at 2553 (White, J., concurring). 
25. Id. at 2545. 
26. Id. at 254749 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE 8 292.02 (1990) (St. 
Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance)). 
27. Id. 
28. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.DN.Y. 1917). 
29. See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476-82 (1966) (Black, J., 
dissenting); see also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 372 (1970) (White, J., 
dissenting). 
30. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). According to the 
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I prefer my (and Judge Hand's) formulation because it 
takes into account both the communicative aspects of behavior 
and the behavioral aspects of communication. However, if 
Justice Scalia is successful in rewriting this aspect of the First 
Amendment, none of these formulations will have much 
influence: Justice Black's distinction becomes irrelevant 
because government can regulate the behavioral aspects of 
speech, the traditional approach fails because it focuses on the 
speaker rather than on government, and my formulation fails 
to  capture the ability of government to  regulate at every point 
on the spectrum so long as it does so without basing its 
restrictions on the content of the speech. The only safe harbor 
is the realm of the mind; once the thinker opens his or her 
mouth, government obtains a regulatory power, and the greater 
the restriction, the less objectionable it is constitutionally. 
11. ENDING ~VERNMENTAL SUBSIDIES FOR SPEECH 
The laws-of-general-applicability proposition goes hand in 
hand with an emerging notion, both on the Court and in the 
political arena, that government subsidies are not 
constitutionally compelled and indeed may be constitutionally 
repugnant. The general-applicability concept addresses whether 
government is required or allowed to provide exemptions for 
either speech or religion; the subsidy question addresses 
whether government may refuse to support, or is even 
prohibited from supporting, expression or religious practices. 
This section looks at subsidies for speech, which will lead t o  a 
short discussion of the Establishment Clause in the next 
section. 
The primary cases in the speech area are Rust v. 
Sullivans1 (upholding the "gag rule" on abortion advice), 
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movements2 (striking down 
some permit fees for parades), and International Society for 
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lees3 (upholding some 
limitations on Hare Krishna activities in airports). Rust is an 
Court in O'Brien, even if it is determined that conduct is "protected expression," 
the government may nevertheless suppress or regulate it if such action (1) "is 
within the constitutional power of the Government"; (2) "furthers an important or 
substantial governmental interest"; (3) "is unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression"; and (4) there are no less restrictive alternatives. 
31. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). 
32. 112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992). 
33. 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992). 
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example of market economics applied to the government as  a 
purchasing agent for the consumer. If the government is just a 
buyer, then the government merely purchases a service from a 
doctor and cannot be required to pay for that which it does not 
choose to buy, such as gratuitous advice and information about 
abortion. This is not terribly noteworthy so long as the doctor is 
not a full-time employee of the government and so long as the 
government is not able to exercise market dominance, becoming 
a regulator through its entrepreneurial role. 
If Rust applied to a full-time employee whose entire 
professional life were purchased by the governmental entity, 
then state law school professors, as well as county clerical 
employees, would have no claims for freedom of speech against 
an employment policy restricting the subjects on which they 
could speak. Traditionally, a law school professor has been told 
to teach a particular class (e.g., Civil Procedure) and could be 
fired for failing to teach that subject, but he or she could not be 
fired for teaching either Marxist or neo-classical economic 
theory as the basis for Civil Procedure. The law school 
professor has even enjoyed the freedom to criticize openly the 
content of Civil Procedure as well as the desirability of 
teaching the course. Similarly, the county clerical employee 
(although subject to a silly distinction protecting speech on 
matters of public interest but not on matters of personal 
interest)34 has enjoyed some right to speak even on company 
time. 
In both the law school and the county clerk's office (and 
also in the Rust formulation) the employee is free to say 
whatever he or she wishes when acting outside the zone of 
employment. This freedom could quickly disappear if the 
workday were redefined as a twenty-four hour day. One could 
then argue that the government has purchased the entire time 
of the employee and need not pay for undesired conversation. 
The Rust opinion took some pains to distinguish the 
purchase of services from the provision of a public forum such 
as a ~ n i v e r s i t y . ~ ~  What the Court said about the public forum, 
however, was carefully circumspect and should be read in light 
of other public forum cases. In the first place, the Court stated 
that  "the existence of a government 'subsidg' . . . does not 
justify the restriction of speech in areas that have 'been 
34. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987). 
35. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1776. 
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traditionally open to the public for expressive activity' or have 
been 'expressly dedicated to speech activity.' "36 Maybe the 
subsidy does not justify it, but, according to Barnes, public 
opinion might. 
With regard to public universities, the Rust Court merely 
said that they are "a traditional sphere of free expression so 
fundamental to the functioning of our society" that they are 
protected "by the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the 
First A~nendment."~' In other words, the university and other 
public fora can be subjected to controls that reflect the morality 
of the majority so long as those controls are specXically stated. 
What overbreadth would protect after R.A.V. and Barnes is a 
mystery. The old rules on public fora permitted pure speech in  
traditional public fora unless government could find a 
compelling interest to suppress such speech. A compelling 
- interest usually meant an interest unrelated to the expression 
(i.e., time, place, and manner r eg~ la t ions ) .~~  Now, nothing 
prevents government from simply declaring that previously 
open fora are no longer available for free speech. For example, 
a public park could be closed to speeches offered to anyone 
outside the speaker's family, or a university campus could 
prohibit structures such as the shanties protesting South 
African investments. 
Other public forum cases also seem to be moving in the 
direction of terminating governmental subsidies for speech 
activities. The county ordinance in Forsyth County was struck 
down not because it exacted a fee for parades but because the 
amount of the fee was determined by the likelihood of hostile 
reaction and the need for police protection.3g The implication 
is that a set fee or a fee graduated only by the size of the 
parade would be acceptable. More recently, in International 
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. u. Lee (ISKCON),4° the 
Court returned t o  the troubling problem of solicitation in public 
places, particularly airports. The Court split five to four on two 
different issues, with Justice O'Connor the swing vote, 
upholding a ban on solicitation and striking down a ban on 
36. Id. (citations omitted). 
37. Id. 
38. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
39. Forsyth County, 112 S. Ct. at 2403-04. 
40. 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992). 
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distribution of literature in airports? Generally speaking, all 
Justices agreed that there are certain areas known as 
traditional public fora, some that are designated public fora, 
and some that are neither." As Justice Kennedy pointed out, 
however, nothing other than history and governmental choice 
distinguishes among these areas.43 Therefore, a court has no 
firm basis on which to overturn the managing agency's 
categorization of a particular area. 
ISKCON is problematic because government was not only 
providing the physical forum but also the audience. The 
travelers were brought to the airport for one purpose and then 
became captive targets of solicitation and distribution of 
literature. The airport authority believed that it was not 
required to provide both the forum and the audience, that 
allowing the display of information was a sufficient use of the 
public forum as defined by the nature of the use to which the 
building was put, and that it could protect the audience 
members by restricting personal contact. According to the 
shifting majorities of the Court, this rationale works only to a 
limited degree. ISKCON seems to stand for the proposition that 
some degree of subsidy for speech-like activities in "traditional 
public fora" is required by the First Amendment, but two 
points make this conclusion shaky. First, privatization of 
governmental facilities could radically alter the 44tradition" 
attached to various fora. Second, the choice of tradition seems 
malleable by the Court itself, subject to changing majority 
attitudes toward what speech activities ought to be permitted 
in what places. 
The Rust approach is noteworthy because it allows 
government to refuse subsidies for undesired communication. 
The public forum cases make the future of governmental 
subsidization of communication very much a matter of judicial 
attitude. Religion cases have shown a similar tendency, a t  least 
in the establishment context. 
111. ELIMINATING SUBSIDIES THROUGH 
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
Lee v. Weisman" and County of Allegheny v. A C L ~ ~  
41. Id. at 2711. 
42. Id. at 2705-06; id. at 2711-12 (O'Co~or, J., concurring); id. at 2724-25 
( K e ~ e d y ,  J., concurring); id. at 2717-20 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
43. Id. at 2717-20 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
44. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). 
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both involved governmental subsidization of religious messages 
on government property or government time. Lee was fairly 
simple to resolve because it involved direct governmental 
support of religious speech without much countenrailing 
argument regarding the need for access to the forum in 
question. Allegheny, on the other hand, troubled and split the 
Court because of the apparent legitimacy of the claim by 
religious groups for access to the forum. The Court delved 
deeply into the mechanics and settings of the different displays 
to determine the extent to which each represented 
impermissible governmental support (variously described as 
support, endorsement, or proselytization) for each 
The trouble with this approach, which stems from the 
"Reindeer Rule" developed in Lynch u. D0nnelly,4~ is that it 
makes the validity of every instance of religious access to a 
public forum dependent on a weighing of facts and 
circumstances by the Supreme Court. 
As Dean Nichol recently pointed out, both the left and the 
right are currently irritated by the lack of certainty in 
constitutional adj~dication.~' The   em on" test, as applied in 
cases such as those involving religious displays, is a prime 
target for this type of attack. The "test" is a good statement of 
why some types of governmental services to religion are 
inappropriate, namely those that cannot be offered without 
requiring government to monitor the use of the aid to 
determine whether it is  being used for a sectarian purpose, but 
it is not a good "test" for deciding cases. The last two prongs of 
the Lemon test create an  apparent conundrum-aid must not 
be used primarily for sectarian purposes, but government 
cannot monitor the use of the aid. By implication, if monitoring 
the use of the aid to comply with the second prong would 
require governmental dictation of religious practices, then the 
aid itself is invalid. 
45. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
46. Id. at 608. 
47. 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (indicating that although the Establishment Clause 
would be violated by a city-sponsored cdche display, it would probably not be 
violated by a display of Santa Claus and his reindeer). 
48. Gene R. Nichol, The Left, the Right, and Certainty in Constitutional Law, 
33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1181 (1992). 
49. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding that government does not 
establish religion if the statute or governmental practice in question (1) has a 
primary secular purpose, (2) does not advance religion, and (3) does not involve 
"government entanglement" with religion). 
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The Lemon test is flawed, not because of the theme it 
strikes, but because it is used to decide specific cases rather 
than set out general rules. If Lemon were used to lay down 
rules that  could be applied with certainty, less ambiguity about 
the test would exist. For example, in the field of education 
subsidies, Lemon could stand for the proposition that payments 
to parochial schools for books and supplies are permissible, but 
that  payments for salaries are not. The salaries fail to meet the 
Lemon test because monitoring a teacher to see how the salary 
is spent requires the state to determine what the teacher does 
with regard to her religious beliefs. Why does the prohibition of 
subsidies not apply to tuition and books for parochial schools as 
well as to salaries of teachers? This reflects a more practical 
accommodation to reality-state governments currently need 
help to produce quality education, and the parochial schools 
can provide a subsidy to government by absorbing some of the 
costs of education if government also absorbs some of the 
costs.50 We have always allowed some subsidies to religion in 
the form of municipal services,. and payments for books and 
tuition can be viewed as such a neutral subsidy. Lemon works 
fine as an explanation for why some categories of subsidies are 
impermissible; it does not work well, however, as a case-by-case 
test for particular subsidies. 
With this explanation of Lemon, Lee becomes an even 
easier case. A subsidy to religion provided by use of a 
governmental forum for prayers at official ceremonies would 
require governmental monitoring of the prayer to assure that it 
is not an endorsement of a particular religion. As soon as 
government involves itself in this way, it is simultaneously 
trampling on free exercise and establishment rights. The notion 
of an officially approved "American civic religion'"' should be 
so deeply offensive to religious people as to ensure the demise 
of all government-sponsored prayer. 
Had it been argued in Lee that religious speakers were 
entitled to have access to a public forum as in Allegheny, then 
the free exercise claim would have to be answered. But Lee 
does not involve a public forum. The forum there, as in most 
official ceremonies or events, was not open. Appearance on the 
50. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983). 
51. Stein v. Plainwell Community Sch., 822 F.2d 1406, 1409 (6th Cir. 1987); see 
also Yehudah Mirsky, Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YATX L.J. 
1237 (1986). 
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program was by official invitation only.52 The agenda was 
limited just as much as the agenda and the right of the floor 
are limited in a legislative session or a judicial proceeding. If 
the agenda includes an open forum, as is sometimes the case in 
a city council meeting, then government officials can hardly 
censor the speech of citizens on that agenda by preventing 
them from praying during the time allocated for public access. 
But, as will be explained, nothing in the Free Exercise Clause 
demands that a closed agenda be opened. 
IV. FREE EXERCISE AND SUBSIDIES 
In essence, the Establishment Clause states that  
government may not subsidize religion, a t  least not in a way 
that favors some religions or requires governmental control of 
religion. Does anything in the Free Exercise Clause demand 
that otherwise closed fora be opened? First, let us compare the 
Free Exercise Clause to what is required by the Free Speech 
Clause. Because subsidies for religious exercise are constrained 
by establishment principles, i t  would seem that the Free 
Exercise Clause ought to contain less than the Free Speech 
Clause. And we have seen that the Free Speech Clause 
requires subsidies in the form of public fora only if tradition or 
government choice dictates. Under this view, Smith is right 
because an exemption for accommodation purposes is not 
required and may not even be permissible. 
I t  may be argued that such a statement makes too great a 
leap from prohibiting subsidies to prohibiting accommodations. 
The argument would claim that an exemption is not a subsidy. 
But the reason for prohibiting the subsidy is the same as the 
reason for prohibiting the accommodation. To administer either 
would require the government to decide what is a qualifying 
religious practice and to ensure that neither the subsidy nor 
the accommodation is used for support of a particular religion. 
That is the same two-horned dilemma posed by Lemon and is 
impossible to meet in many contexts. What Smith accomplishes 
is elimination of judicial control of religion or favoritism for 
particular religions. 
Justice Scalia seems to say that there is a good reason for 
a constitutional prohibition of subsidization of religion through 
the Free Exercise Clause. A constitutionally based subsidy 
52. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2652. 
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would require courts to decide what religious practices are 
entitled to the subsidy, which would require courts to define 
religion for purposes of the American Cons t i t~ t ion .~~  Scalia 
says that judicially defined religion would be unacceptable, and 
good arguments support his position. A judicial definition of 
religion could aasily become an  establishment. It would grant 
exemptions only to religious practices favored by the judiciary. 
The remaining question is whether Smith is a threat to all 
government subsidies in the form of exemptions and 
accommodations. If courts are not entitled to decide what 
qualifies as a religion, why is the legislature or executive 
entitled to make similar decisions? The First Amendment 
seems to be emphatic about preventing the legislature from 
making any law that tends toward (respects) an establishment 
of religion. Exemptions that are not required by the Free 
Exercise Clause tend toward an establishment. Moreover, they 
interfere with the self-definition of religious practice. 
As an extreme example, consider the application of Title 
VII to the priesthood of the Catholic Church by elimination of 
the religious exemption in Title VII. The statute would then be 
a law of general applicability, not targeted at either religion or 
communication. Would there be any free exercise claim for the 
religious basis of the employment practices of the church? Not 
according to Smith. Take the argument a step further. Is the 
religious exemption unconstitutional? The Court held in 
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos54 that it was not. 
But the anti-exemption language of Smith is difficult to square 
with that result. Moreover, the institutional nature of churches 
makes them even less likely candidates for exemptions than 
are  individual^.^^ 
There is a certain attraction in Smith's impetus toward 
keeping the courts, and by implication the other branches of 
government, out of the business of defining religion. But the 
demise of governmental subsidies for expression and the 
collapsing of all distinctions between speech and conduct offend 
53. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886-87. 
54. 483 U.S. 327, 337 (1987). 
55. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Tony & Susan 
Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U S .  290 (1985); see also William P.  
Marshall, The Inequality of Anti-establishment, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 70. 
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my eighteenth century respect for individual liberty and 
conscience. If Justice Scalia were willing to acknowledge 
exemptions from governmental controls for expressive conduct 
in a wide variety of circumstances, then I would agree with his 
position that the Free Exercise Clause merely protects freedom 
of expression. Where I part company with him is in the lack of 
protection he affords to  expressive conduct. He leaves us with 
exemptive protections only for pure speech, a position that I 
thought we had abandoned decades ago for very good reasons. 
At this juncture, ending all religious exemptions would be 
too much rationality too fast. Eventually, perhaps, we should 
eliminate both subsidies and exemptions for religious 
institutions, but more protection for individual expression 
should be given in return. 
